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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Information-hiding is a major concern in today’s networked world of interacting
agents, be they unconcerned Internet bots or caring humans concerned by malicious
such bots (spambots, viruses, worms, etc.). Anonymity (the absence of information
about an agent’s identity) is a major end of information-hiding. Whereas oblivious
transfer (implying the absence of information about an agent’s receiving action to the
corresponding sending agent) is a major and even foundational (Kilian, 1988) means
thereto. Since protocols for information hiding often involve randomization, it seems
natural to consider a quantitative approach to the formalization of information-hiding
properties.
1.2. Contribution
We propose a modal logic, namely the doxastic µ-calculus with error control
(DµCEC). The formulas of DµCEC are interpreted in terms of the processes of a
small protocol specification formalism, namely CCS with probabilistic internal choice
(CCSp), which is a variant of the language proposed in (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007a;
Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007b). We show some application examples of our logic
to the archetypical dining cryptographers (Chaum, 1988), and to oblivious transfer
(Rabin, 1981) for single bits and entire strings. In both cases, we specify the proto-
col in CCSp. The distinguishing feature of our logic is to provide a combination of
dynamic operators for belief (whence the attribute “doxastic”) with a control on the
possible error of apprehension of the perceived reality, and for internalized probability.
Both operators are dynamic (non-monotonic) thanks to the possibility of combining
them with temporal operators, and are parameterized with a lower and upper probabil-
ity bound (the error control).
Dynamicity is useful for the logical formalization of the original intuition of proba-
bilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer, which is the one of an invariant w.r.t. a priori
and a posteriori stances of apprehension of the perceived reality (cf. Sections 4 and
5.2). The belief operator is used to express that an agent a believes with confidence of
at least l and at most u that a state of affairs φ is the case. The operator for internalized
probability is used to express that a state of affairs φ is the case with certainty of at
least l and at most u. Note that confidence is a qualification of an agent’s belief (that
something is the case), whereas certainty is just a qualification of something being the
case: confidence has a subjective (belief) connotation whereas certainty has an objec-
tive (truth) connotation. In our framework, both qualifications are also quantitative
thanks to the mentioned error control in terms of a lower and upper probability bound.
A technical feature of our logic is that operators for belief and internalized probability
can be nested, and that nested such operators can be flattened on certain, but different
conditions.
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The paper continues the previous work by some of the authors. In particular,
in (Bhargava et al., 2005) we have developed a probabilistic framework for ano-
nymity. In (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2009) we have refined that framework by us-
ing an information-theoretic approach, and in (Beauxis et al., 2008) we have pre-
sented an overview of the various frameworks in literature for formalizing the no-
tion of (absence of) leakage in information-hiding protocol. In (Chatzikokolakis et
al., 2007b; Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007a) we have developed a probabilistic version
of CCS and of the pi-calculus respectively. In (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007a) we have
used the latter to model the oblivious transfer, and we have proved its correctness by
extending standard process-theoretic techniques.
In this paper we propose a logic for expressing properties based on belief, such
as “the execution of the protocol does not increase the belief about the identity of the
culprit” (anonymity), and “Alice believes with degree of confidence 1/2 that Bob has
received the bit 0” (a feature of the oblivious transfer). The advantages of having a
logic, with respect to the approaches based on expressing the properties directly on
the underlying formalism used to model the protocol, are the following: First, the
logic is more high-level and it allows to reason about the properties more deeply, by
highlighting their subtelties. Second, this way the properties are independent from the
formalism used for representing the protocol. Third, the logic is more expressive, in
particular thanks to the fact that allows distinguishing between subjective and objec-
tive uncertainty, i.e. between belief and probabilistic truth. Consider for instance the
property of strong anonymity: In (Bhargava et al., 2005) is is expressed as equality
of the conditional probability of getting a certain observable under different culprits.
Intuitively we intend such probabilities to represent the subjective uncertainty of the
attacker, but, having only one form of probability, in that paper we cannot distinguish
between belief or probabilistic truth. Here we are able to make such distinction, and
we express strong anonymity in terms of belief (see Section 4). A similar consider-
ation holds for the properties of the Oblivious Transfer analysed in (Chatzikokolakis
et al., 2007a), which are represented here by using both belief and probabilistic truth
(see Section 5).
1.3. Related work
The literature on belief logics is large due to their wide applicability in philosoph-
ical logic, artificial intelligence, and information security. However, all belief logics
we are aware of are either only about belief without error control, or static belief with
error control.
In (Halpern et al., 2005a), the authors introduce static belief with error control
in the form of a functional symbol (term constructor) Pri(φ) to be used in atomic
formulas Pri(φ) ≤ α that are true in a certain state by definition if and only if the
probability that φ is true is at most α in that state. The probability value results from a
probability measure applied to the set of all those states that are indistinguishable from
the current state to agent i and where φ is true. The authors then obtain a formalization
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of probabilistic anonymity for the dining cryptographers that mixes static knowledge
(as a modality) and static belief. The logic is static, i.e. it does not have a temporal
fragment. A fortiori, the belief in the logic is static (not possibly evolving). Also, the
authors do not explicitly account for the possible presence of a scheduler, whereas we
explicitly do.
In (Halpern et al., 2005b), the authors introduce what they call randomized, explicit
(or algorithmic) belief. The intuition is that
a randomized knowledge algorithm returning “Yes” to a query about a
fact φ provides evidence for φ being true.
The algorithm always returns either “Yes”, “No”, or “Don’t know”, and the return
value “Yes” may depend on the outcome of coin tosses. The authors’ motivation for
the algorithmic modeling of belief is the resource-boundedness of real agents, which
are thus identified with algorithms. The authors define measurable upper and lower
weights that an answer given the knowledge algorithm, i.e. an observation, lends to a
particular hypothesis in the set of hypotheses. Such a weight is not a probability mea-
sure, but rather “a prescription for how to update a prior probability on the hypotheses
into a posterior probability on those hypotheses, after having considered the observa-
tions made”. The goal of the authors of (Halpern et al., 2005b) is “to understand what
the evidence provided by a knowledge algorithm tells us.”, which is quite a different
than ours.
In (Lomuscio et al., 2007), the authors present a formalization of non-probabilistic
anonymity for the dining cryptographers expressed in a modal logic combining knowl-
edge and time. Hence, their notion of knowledge is dynamic, yet not inflected with
probability: it really is knowledge, which necessarily is true, and not belief, which
possibly is false.
In (Dechesne et al., 2007), the authors present a formalization of non-probabilistic
anonymity for the dining cryptographers expressed in the µ-calculus with knowledge.
Hence, the same comments apply as for (Lomuscio et al., 2007). Additionally, their
logic is, as ours, closely tied to a process calculus.
Internalized probability in our logic is based on the construct [φ]p introduced in
(Parma et al., 2007) to represent probabilistic statements. A different probabilistic
extension of Hennessy-Milner logic is the one of (Larsen et al., 1991; Desharnais et
al., 1998), where they consider a probabilistic variant a p of the modal operator a . In-
tuitively, a pφmeans that a process can perform an a-transition and go with probability
at least p to a state that satisfies φ. As showed in (Parma et al., 2007), the operator [φ]p
is more expressive, because a pφ can be represented as a [φ]p. Furthermore, Parma
and Segala have shown that the operator [φ]p is necessary for characterizing (prob-
abilistic) bisimulation in systems that allow both probabilistic and non-deterministic
branching from the same state, which turns out to be the case for CCSp.
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1.4. Plan of the paper
The next section recalls basic theory about probabilities, probabilistic automata,
and probabilistic CCS. In Section 3, we introduce the doxastic µ-calculus with error
control (DµCEC). Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to the formalization and validation
of probabilistic anonymity and oblivious transfer. Section 6 concludes the paper with
an assessment of achievements and future work.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief introduction to probability spaces, probabilistic
automata (Segala, 1995; Segala et al., 1995), and probabilistic CCS (Chatzikokolakis
et al., 2007b; Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007a).
2.1. Probability spaces
Let Ω designate a set. A σ-field over Ω is a collection F of subsets of Ω closed
under complement and countable union and such that Ω ∈ F . Ω is also called the
sample space of the σ-field F . If B is a collection of subsets of Ω then the σ-field
generated by B is defined as the smallest σ-field containing B (its existence is ensured
by the fact that the intersection of an arbitrary set of σ-fields containing B is still a
σ-field containing B).
A probability measure on F is a function µ : F → [0,∞] such that
1) µ(∅) = 0,
2) µ(
⋃
i Ci) =
∑
i µ(Ci) if {Ci}i is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint
elements of F , and
3) µ(Ω) = 1.
A probability space is a tuple (Ω,F , µ) where Ω is a set, called the sample space,
F is a σ-field on Ω and µ is a probability measure on F . The elements of a σ-field F
are also called events.
For x ∈ Ω, we denote by δ(x) (called the Dirac measure on x) the probability
measure on F s.t. δ(x)({y}) = 1 if y = x, and δ(x)({y}) = 0 otherwise. If
{ci}i are convex coefficients (namely ci ≥ 0 for all i and
∑
i ci = 1), and {µi}i
are probability measures, we denote by
∑
i ciµi the probability measure defined as
(
∑
i ciµi)(A)
∆=
∑
i ciµi(A). We denote by supp(µ)
∆= {x ∈ Ω | µ(x) > 0} the
support set of µ.
If A,B are events then A∩B is also an event. If µ(A) > 0 then we can define the
conditional probability p(B | A), meaning “the probability of B given A”, as
p(B | A) ∆= µ(A ∩B)
µ(A)
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Note that p( · | A) is a new probability measure on F . In continuous probability
spaces, where many events have zero probability, it is possible to generalize the con-
cept of conditional probability to allow conditioning on such events. However, this
is not necessary for the needs of this paper. Thus we will use the above “traditional”
definition of conditional probability and make sure that we never condition on events
of zero probability.
A probability space and the corresponding probability measure are called discrete
if Ω is countable and F = 2Ω. In this case, we can construct µ from a function
p : Ω → [0, 1] satisfying∑x∈Ω p(x) = 1 by assigning µ({x}) = p(x). The set of all
discrete probability measures with sample space Ω will be denoted by Disc(Ω).
2.2. Probabilistic automata
In this section we introduce the probabilist automata of (Segala et al., 1995) fol-
lowing a notation that is similar to the one used in (Segala, 2006). To be closer to the
CCS approach, we resolve the nondeterminism using a restricted class of schedulers:
the Dirac non-halting schedulers. These schedulers choose a transition each time
a transition is available. This restriction allows us to simplify the definition of the
probability measures induced by the scheduler, since it reduces the sample space.
A probabilistic automaton M is a tuple (St , sinit ,Act , T ) where St is a set of
states, sinit ∈ St is the initial state, Act is a set of actions and T ⊆ St × Act ×
Disc(St) is a transition relation. Intuitively, if (s, a, µ) ∈ T then there is a transition
from the state s performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states
of the automaton. The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones in
T is performed non-deterministically, and the choice of the target state among the ones
allowed by µ (i.e. those states s′ such that µ(s′) > 0) is performed probabilistically.
Note that in general from a state there can be two transitions with the same action
leading to two different distributions.
An execution fragment h of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) alter-
nating sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . . of states and actions, such that for each i there is a
transition (si, ai+1, µi) ∈ T and µi(si+1) > 0. The concatenation of a finite execu-
tion fragment h1 = s0 . . . ansn and an execution fragment h2 = snan+1sn+1 . . . is
the execution fragment h1 · h2 = s0 . . . ansnan+1sn+1 . . .. A finite execution frag-
ment h1 is a prefix of h, written h1 ≤ h, if there is an execution fragment h2 such that
h = h1 ·h2. We use fst(h), lst(h) to denote the first and last state of a finite execution
fragment h respectively. An execution (or history) h is an execution fragment such
that fst(h) = sinit . An execution h is maximal if it is infinite or there is no transition
from lst(h) in T . We denote by exec∗(M ), exec⊥(M ), and exec(M ) the set of all the
finite, all the non maximal, and all the executions of M , respectively.
A scheduler for a probabilistic automaton M = (St , sinit ,Act , T ) is a total func-
tion
ζ : exec⊥(M )→ T
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such that ζ(h) = (s, a, µ) ∈ T implies that s = lst(h). The idea is that when we are
in state s the scheduler selects a transition among the ones available in T for s, and it
can base its decision on the history of the execution that has lead to s. As anticipated,
we depart here from the traditional definition of probabilistic automata. First, we
impose totality to be in line with the CCS concept of scheduler, while in general the
scheduler may decide to stop even if a transition is available; second we impose that a
scheduler does not use randomization in resolving nondeterminism, while in general
a scheduler may be randomized.
The execution tree of M under the scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(M , ζ), is a fully
probabilistic automaton M ′ = (St ′, sinit ,Act , T ′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec∗(M ), and
(h, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζ(h) = (lst(h), a, µ) for some µ, and µ′(has) = µ(s).
Intuitively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions of M and resolving
all non-deterministic choices using ζ.
Given a probabilistic automaton M = (St , sinit ,Act , T ) and a scheduler ζ we can
define the probability space (ΩM ,FM , pM ) on the maximal executions of M induced
by ζ as follows:
– ΩM
∆= exec(M ) \ exec⊥(M ) (the set of all the maximal executions of M ).
– Given a finite execution h, the cone with prefix h is defined as Ch
∆= {h′ ∈
ΩM |h ≤ h′}. Define F as the σ-field generated by the set of all cones of M .
– Define the probability of a cone Ch, where h = s0a1s1 . . . ansn, as
p(Ch)
∆=
n∏
i=1
µi(si)
where, for each i, ζ(s0a1s1 . . . ai−1si−1) = (si−1, ai, µi). We define pM ,ζ as the
measure extending p to F (see (Segala, 1995) for more details).
REMARK 1. — The σ-field used in (Segala et al., 1995) considers the sample space
Ω = exec(M) to account for the termination at non-maximal executions. Since here
we require that the schedulers are total, the support of the measure pM ,ζ does not
need to include elements of exec⊥(M ). Note that the σ-field defined in this paper
coincides with the sub-σ-field not containing exec⊥(M ) of the standard σ-field on
probabilistic-automata induced by total schedulers. 
Convention Given a probabilistic automaton M and a scheduler ζ, we denote pM ,ζ
by pζ whenever M is clear from the context.
2.3. CCS with probabilistic internal choice
In this section we introduce the probabilistic CCS CCSp of (Chatzikokolakis et
al., 2007b) as well as its operational semantics in terms of probabilistic automata.
We assume that the number of channel names is finite1. This restriction allows us to
1. Usually it is assumed to be at most countable, so it can be either finite or infinite.
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express certain operators as syntactic sugar, notably the operators · , ^· , and · of
Table 3, thus simplifying the theory. Note that this is not really a restriction in the con-
text of this paper, because we are interested in analysing properties of programs, that,
being finite syntactic entities, can only contain a fixed number of channel names.
Let A be a set of channel names, which, for the purposes of this paper, we assume
to be finite. Each a ∈ A represents the action of making an input from the channel a,
and the corresponding output action on a is denoted by a¯. The actions a and a¯ are seen
as complementary, and we require a¯ = a. Let A¯ = {a¯ | a ∈ A} and let τ /∈ A ∪ A¯
represent the invisible action. The set Act = A ∪ A¯ ∪ {τ} is the set of actions, which
we represent by a, b, . . .. We assume that τ has no complement, hence the notation a¯
implies that a 6= τ .
The syntax of CCSp is the following:
P,Q F processes
a . P action prefix
| ◦∑i piPi probabilistic internal choice
| P | Q parallel
| P +Q non-deterministic internal choice
| (νa)P restriction
| !P replication
| 0 nil
We also use the notation P1 ⊕p P2 to represent a binary probabilistic choice ◦
∑
i piPi
with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p.
The semantics of a CCSp term is a probabilistic automaton whose states are CCSp
processes, and whose transitions are defined inductively on the basis of the syntax
according to the rules in Table 1. We write s a−→ µ to indicate that (s, a, µ) is a
transition of the probabilistic automaton. We also denote by µ | Q the measure µ′
such that µ′(P | Q) = µ(P ) for all processes P and µ′(R) = 0 if R is not of the form
P | Q. Similarly (νa)µ = µ′ such that µ′((νa)P ) = µ(P ) and µ′(P ′) = 0 if P ′ is
not of the form (νa)P .
The semantics of CCSp is a conservative extension of the one of CCS, in the sense
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the rules of CCSp, except PROB,
and those of CCS. The correspondence is evident after observing that a transition of
the form P a−→ δ(P ′), i.e. a transition having for target a Dirac measure, corresponds
to a transition P a−→ P ′ in a standard labeled transition system.
We explain briefly the meaning of the rules: ACT represents the execution of the
action a in a.P . PAR1 and the omitted rule PAR2 represent the fact that in P | Q,
the process P (resp. Q) can execute a step while Q (resp. P ) stays idle (interleaving).
COM represents a communication step between P and Q in P | Q, which can take
place when P and Q are ready to perform complementary actions. SUM1 and the
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Table 1. The semantics of CCSp. PAR1 and SUM1 have corresponding right rules
PAR2 and SUM2, omitted for simplicity.
ACT
a . P
a−→ δ(P ) PROB ◦∑i piPi τ−→∑i piδ(Pi)
PAR1 P
a−→ µ
P | Q a−→ µ | Q COM
P
a−→ δ(P ′) Q a−→ δ(Q′)
P | Q τ−→ δ(P ′ | Q′)
SUM1 P
a−→ µ
P +Q a−→ µ RES
P
b−→ µ b 6= a, a
(νa)P b−→ (νa)µ
REP1 P
a−→ µ
!P a−→ µ | !P REP2
P
a−→ δ(P1) P a−→ δ(P2)
!P τ−→ δ(P1 | P2 | !P )
omitted rule SUM2 represent the commitment of the nondeterministic choice P + Q
to P (resp. Q) branch, provided that it is not suspended, i.e. it can make a step. RES
filters out the transitions with label a or a¯ from a process restricted on a. REP1 and
REP2 express the fact that !P can spawn one (resp two) copies of P and let these
copies perform a step.
Finally, PROB models probabilistic internal choice: a silent τ transition is avail-
able from the sum to a measure containing all of its operands, with the corresponding
probabilities. Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-
Dirac measures are silent, because they are originated from PROB. Note also that a
probabilistic term generates exactly one (probabilistic) transition.
It is interesting to observe that the resulting automaton is consistent with the def-
inition of alternating automaton of (Parma et al., 2007): a probabilistic automaton is
alternating if the states that enable a non-Dirac transition enable only one transition.
We call probabilistic those states that enable non-Dirac transitions, and nondetermin-
istic all the other states. In other words, a probabilistic state enables at most one tran-
sition while a nondeterministic state may enable several transitions with the constrait
that the target measure of each of these transitions is a Dirac measure.
3. A quantitative doxastic logic and its interpretation in CCSp
In this section we propose an extension DµCEC of Nielsen’s µ-calculus with past
(Nielsen, 1998) suitable for expressing information-hiding properties and for reason-
ing about protocols for privacy.
A Logic for Probabilistic Processes 9
Recall that the µ-calculus has modal operators a that express the future capabili-
ties of a process: the formula a φ means that a process can perform the action a and
evolve into a new process that satisfies φ. In addition to these, Nielsen’s calculus con-
tains also their past counterparts ^a : the formula ^a φ means that the process is the
outcome of an a-transition from another process which satisfies φ.
We extend Nielsen’s calculus in two ways:
– We internalize probabilistic truth in the form of probabilistic statements which
are based on Parma and Segala’s probabilistic extension (Parma et al., 2007) of
Hennessy-Milner logic. They consider constructs like [φ]p, where p is a parameter
representing a probability. Formulas are interpreted on probability measures, and the
meaning of [φ]p is that the set of states that satisfy φ has probability at least p with re-
spect to the given measure. We actually consider constructs like Pqp(φ), meaning that
the set of states that satisfy φ has probability at least p and at most q. The operator
Pqp(φ) could be approximated by [φ]p ∧¬[φ]q+, but we prefer to have the former as a
primitive because in some example we need exact probabilities.
– We add belief in the form of doxastic operators iBqp which represent the degree
of confidence of agents about the truth of formulas in DµCEC. Intuitively the formula
iB
q
p(φ) means that the agent i estimates that there is a probability at least p and at
most q that the process satisfies φ. Note that in general iBqp(P
1
1(φ)) and iB
1
1(P
q
p(φ))
are not equivalent, and neither are P11(iB
q
p(φ)) and P
q
p(iB
1
1(φ)).
The syntax of DµCEC is given by the following grammar, where p and q are con-
stant between 0 and 1:
φF > | X | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | a φ | ^a φ | Pqp(φ) | iBqp(φ) | lfpXφ(X)
where in the least fixpoint formula lfpXφ(X), the variable X is assumed to occur
positively in φ. To define formally what it means thatX occurs positively in a formula,
we use the standard notion of context C[ ] and define the concepts of positive and
negative context as follows.
DEFINITION 2. — For a context C[ ], the properties of being positive and being neg-
ative are defined inductively as follows:
[ ] is positive
C[ ] ∧ φ is positive if C[ ] is positive
φ ∧ C[ ] is positive if C[ ] is positive
pop(C[ ]) is positive if C[ ] is positive with pop = a , ^a ,P1p, or iB1p
nop(C[ ]) is positive if C[ ] is negative with nop = ¬,Pp0, or iBp0
lfpXC[X] is positive (C[ ] must be positive)
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and
C[ ] ∧ φ is negative if C[ ] is negative
φ ∧ C[ ] is negative if C[ ] is negative
pop(C[ ]) is negative if C[ ] is negative with pop = a , ^a ,P1p, or iB1p
nop(C[ ]) is negative if C[ ] is positive with nop = ¬,Pp0, or iBp0
DEFINITION 3. — X occurs positively in φ if φ = C[X] for some positive context
C[ ].
REMARK 4. — Informally, a variable X occurs positively if it is not within the scope
of an odd numer of negations, that is if we use the actual value of X and not its
negations. There exists another implicit kind of negation that occurs when we impose
an upper bound to the probability of a positive occurrence of X or when we impose a
lower bound to the probability of a negative occurrence ofX . This leads to the relative
definition of operators Pqp. 
We want to use this logic to express properties of processes written in CCSp, hence
we are now going to provide an interpretation of the logic in CCSp, i.e. we define a
satisfaction relation |= between CCSp and DµCEC.
In standard Hennessy-Milner logic, and in µ-calculus, satisfaction is usually de-
fined with respect to processes. Here we need to interpret the doxastic operators iBqp,
and for this purpose we must consider not just the current process, but the whole (fi-
nite) history of the execution, because of the dynamic nature of our notion of belief.
Furthermore, as explained before, in order to interpret the formulas Pqp(φ) we need to
consider probabilistic measures. In conclusion, we are going to take as domain the set
of discrete distributions Disc(H), where H is the set of finite histories generated by
CCSp.
Given a history h, an action a, and a probability distribution on states µ, we denote
by haµ the extension of µ to the histories of the form haP , for every CCSp process
P . Namely:
(haµ)(h′) ∆=
{
µ(P ) if h′ = haP
0 otherwise
The interpretation of the operators iBqp is based on an epistemic accessibility relation
≡i on finite histories. Intuitively h1 ≡i h2 represents the fact that the histories h1
and h2 are indistinguishable to i. ≡i is usually chosen to be an equivalence relation
as induced by the local view of i. We assume that the local view is only restricted to
actions, hence we consider the projection of histories on actions (traces). Intuitively,
the trace of h is the string of the actions in h, i.e. what is left in h after we remove all
the states. More formally:
DEFINITION 5. — Given a finite history h, the trace of h is defined inductively as
follows:
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– trace(P ) =  (the empty trace)
– trace(haP ) = trace(h)a
We assume that in general an agent has only a partial view on actions. Formally,
this can be represented by introducing the following abstraction function:
ASSUMPTION 6. — For every agent i we assume a function fi : A→ A∪ {} which
represents i’s view on actions. 
We can now define the accessibility relation on traces and histories. We use for
simplicity the same symbol ≡i to denote both relations.
DEFINITION 7. —
– For every agent i, the relation≡i on traces is defined inductively as follows:
-  ≡i 
- ta ≡i t′b if either fi(a) = fi(b) and t ≡i t′
or
fi(a) =  and t ≡i t′fi(b)
or
fi(b) =  and tfi(a) ≡i t′
– For every agent i, the relation ≡i on histories is defined as follows:
h ≡i h′ if and only if trace(h) ≡i trace(h′)
We can now define the interpretation of DµCEC with respect to the process terms
of CCSp. We only consider the closed formulas of DµCEC, namely only the formulas
in which all variable occurrences are bound.
DEFINITION 8. — The relation |= on Disc(H) and on the closed formula of DµCEC
is defined according to the clauses in Table 2. In the table, J K is defined as JφK ∆=
{h | δ(h) |= φ}, while pζ represents the probability measure on etree(P, ζ) (see
section 2.2), and [h]≡i is the equivalence class of h with respect to ≡i. Finally, if H
is a set of executions, ↓ H represents the maximal executions with prefix in H , i.e.
↓H ∆= {h ∈ ΩP |∃h′ ∈ H.h′ ≤ h}
In the definition of µ |= iBqp(φ), the idea is that the probability that the process
satisfies φ given any h′ indistinguishable from h in i’s view is between p and q. We
quantify over all possible schedulers because in general i does not know what is the
scheduler, except for the partial view it has on h.
The auxiliary “hybrid formulas” DX (“auxiliary” because they do not exist in the
syntax of the language, and “hybrid” because X represents a set of executions) are
introduced to define the semantics of lfpX .
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Table 2. Definition of satisfaction for the closed formulas in DµCEC.
µ |= >
µ |= φ1 ∧ φ2 :iff µ |= φ1 and µ |= φ2
µ |= ¬φ :iff µ 6|= φ
µ |= a φ :iff for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists η and a transition
lst(h) a−→ η such that haη |= φ
µ |= ^a φ :iff there exists h′ such that lst(h′) a−→ µ and δ(h′) |= φ
µ |= Pqp(φ) :iff p ≤ µ(JφK) ≤ q
µ |= iBqp(φ) :iff for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for fst(h)
we have p ≤ pζ(↓JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q
µ |= lfpXφ(X) :iff µ ∈
⋂{DX ⊆ Disc(H) | ∀η ∈ Disc(H)
if η |= φ(X := DX)
then η |= DX}
µ |= DX :iff µ ∈ DX
P |= φ :iff δ(P ) |= φ
The semantic correspondent of lfpXφ(X) (i.e. the set of distributions that satisfy
lfpXφ(X)) is the least fixed point of a transformation Tφ : 2Disc(H) → 2Disc(H) de-
fined as follows:
Tφ(D) ∆= {µ | µ |= φ(X := D)}
It can be proved that ifX occurs positively in φ(X) then Tφ is monotonic on the lattice
(2Disc(H),⊆) which, by the Theorem of Knaster-Tarski, implies the existence of the
least and greatest fixed points. The core of the proof is Theorem 10 below.
DEFINITION 9 (MONOTONICITY). — For any formula φ in DµCEC, let {|φ|} de-
note the set {µ | µ |= φ}. An n-ary operator op in DµCEC is monotonic2 if
for all φ1, . . . , φn, ψ1, . . . , ψn, we have that {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, . . . , {|φn|} ⊆ {|ψn|}
implies {|op(φ1, . . . , φn)|} ⊆ {|op(ψ1, . . . , ψn)|}. It is antimonotonic if for all
φ1, . . . , φn, ψ1, . . . , ψn, we have that {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, . . . , {|φn|} ⊆ {|ψn|} implies
{|op(ψ1, . . . , ψn)|} ⊆ {|op(φ1, . . . , φn)|}.
THEOREM 10. — The operators ∧, a , ^a , P1p, iB1p and lfpX are monotonic. The
operators ¬, Pp0 and iBp0 are antimonotonic.
PROOF. — The proof proceeds by case analysis. We consider here only the operators
that are used in this paper, i.e. those which appear in the scope of a lfp or gfp operator
2. Not to be confused with monotonicity and non-monotonicity of belief with respect to time.
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in Table 3. In the following, we assume {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|}, and {|φ2|} ⊆
{|ψ2|}.
∧ ) Let µ |= φ1 ∧ φ2. Then µ |= φ1 and µ |= φ2. Since {|φ1|} ⊆ {|ψ1|} and
{|φ2|} ⊆ {|ψ2|}, we have that µ |= ψ1 and µ |= ψ2. Hence µ |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
¬ ) Let µ |= ¬ψ. Then µ 6|= ψ Since {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, we have that µ 6|= φ. Hence
µ |= ¬φ2.
a ) Let µ |= a φ. Then for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists η and a transition
lst(h) a−→ η such that haη |= φ. Since {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, we have that haη |= ψ. Hence
µ |= a ψ.
^a ) Let µ |= ^a φ. Then for every h ∈ supp(µ) there exists h′ such that
lst(h′) a−→ µ and δ(h′) |= φ. Since {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, we have δ(h′) |= ψ. Hence
µ |= ^a ψ.
iB
1
p ) Let µ |= iB1p(φ). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for
fst(µ) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ 1. Since {|φ|} ⊆ {|ψ|}, we have pζ(↓ JφK | ↓
[h]≡i) ≤ pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i). Hence p ≤ pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ 1, and therefore
µ |= iB1p(ψ).

COROLLARY 11. — If X occurs positively in φ(X) then Tφ is monotonic on the
lattice (2Disc(H),⊆).
COROLLARY 12. — If X occurs positively in φ(X) then the set of fixed points of Tφ
forms a sublattice of (2Disc(H),⊆). In particular, there exists a least and a greatest
fixed point.
3.1. Relation with standard (KD45) belief
In this section we discuss the relation of DµCEC with standard (KD45) belief.
Our operators iBqp and P
q
p satisfy probabilistic extensions of the axioms of stan-
dard belief and truth, in the sense expressed by Theorems 13 and 15 below. In the
following, the operator→ stands for Boolean (material) implication, see Table 3, and
|= φ means that µ |= φ holds for all µ.
THEOREM 13. — For any p, q, r, s ∈ [0, 1], any formulas φ, ψ in DµCEC, and any
agent i, the following hold.
K) |= iBqp(φ→ ψ)→ (iBsr(φ)→ iBqt (ψ)) where t = max{0, p+ r − 1}
D) |= iB00(⊥) (“i does not believe false”)
4) |= iBqp(φ)→ iB1r(iBqp(φ))
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5) |= ¬iBqp(φ)→ iB1r(¬iBqp(φ))
PROOF. —
K) Assume µ |= iBqp(φ → ψ) and µ |= iBsr(φ). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and
for every scheduler ζ for fst(µ) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ Jφ → ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q
and r ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ s. Let v = pζ(↓ Jφ → ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) and
w = pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i). Observe that pζ(↓ Jφ → ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓ Jφ ∧
ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) +pζ(↓J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) +pζ(↓J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i).
From this we obtain pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≥ v − (1 − w) ≥ p + r − 1. Hence
pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≥ max{0, p+ r − 1}.
On the other side, observe that we have pζ(↓ Jφ → ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓Jφ ∧ ψK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓ J¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) + pζ(↓ J¬φK | ↓
[h]≡i) − pζ(↓ Jψ ∧ ¬φK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≥ pζ(↓ JψK | ↓ [h]≡i). Hence we obtain
pζ(↓JψK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q.
D) This statement follows immedialy from the observation that for every scheduler ζ
and every history h we have pζ(↓J⊥K | ↓ [h]≡i) = pζ(↓J⊥K) = 0.
4) Assume µ |= iBqp(φ). Then, for every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for
fst(µ) we have p ≤ pζ(↓ JφK | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q. Hence, for every h ∈ supp(µ)
we have δ(h) |= iBqp(φ), from which we derive that, for every scheduler ζ for
fst(µ), pζ(↓JiBqp(φ)K | ↓ [h]≡i) = 1 holds. Therefore µ |= iB1r(iBqp(φ)).
5) Similar to the proof of (4).

For (4) and (5), when r = 1 the implication holds also in the other direction, which
means that belief can be “flattened” for certain probabilities.
PROPOSITION 14. — For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
– |= iB11(iBqp(φ))→ iBqp(φ)
– |= iB11(¬iBqp(φ))→ ¬iBqp(φ)
PROOF. — Let us consider the first statement. Assume µ |= iB11(iBqp(φ)). Then, for
every h ∈ supp(µ) and for every scheduler ζ for fst(µ) we have pζ(↓ JiBqp(φ)K | ↓
[h]≡i) = 1. Hence, for every h ∈ supp(µ) we have δ(h) |= iBqp(φ), from which we
derive that, for every scheduler ζ for fst(µ), p ≤ pζ(↓ JiBqp(φ)K | ↓ [h]≡i) ≤ q holds.
Therefore µ |= iBqp(φ).
The proof of the second statement is similar. 
For probabilistic truth we have the following
THEOREM 15. — For any p, q, r, s ∈ [0, 1], any formulas φ, ψ in DµCEC, and any
agent i, the following hold.
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K) |= Pqp(φ→ ψ)→ (Psr(φ)→ Pqt (ψ)) where t = max{0, p+ r − 1}
D) |= P00(⊥)
4) |= Pqp(φ)→ Pqp(P1r(φ)) if r > 0
5) |= ¬Pqp(φ)→ Pqp(¬Pr0(φ)) if r < 1
PROOF. —
K) Similar to the proof of (K) in Theorem 13.
D) Similar to the proof of (D) in Theorem 13.
4) Assume µ |= Pqp(φ). Then p ≤ µ(JφK) ≤ q. Observe that h ∈ JφK if and only if
δ(h)(JφK) = 1, or equivalently, for r > 0, r ≤ δ(h)(JφK) ≤ 1. By definition
this is equivalent to δ(h) |= P1r(φ), which holds if and only if h ∈ JP1r(φ)K.
Therefore p ≤ µ(JP1r(φ)K) ≤ q.
5) Similar to the proof of (4).

For (4) and (5), the implication holds also in the other direction, meaning that also
the probabilistic truth can be “flattened” for certain probabilities.
PROPOSITION 16. — For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
– |= Pqp(P1r(φ))→ Pqp(φ) if r > 0.
– |= Pqp(¬Pr0(φ))→ ¬Pqp(φ) if r < 1.
PROOF. — Let us consider the first statement. Assume µ |= Pqp(P1r(φ)). Then p ≤
µ(JP1r(φ)K) ≤ q. Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 15 (4), we
have that (for r > 0) h ∈ JP1r(φ)K if and only if h ∈ JφK. Therefore µ |= Pqp(φ).
The proof of the second statement is similar. 
Finally, we want to point out that the following formulas hold, meaning that our
belief operators behave well with respect to probability measures. The proof is imme-
diate.
PROPOSITION 17. — For every agent i and every formula φ, the following hold
– |= iBqp(φ)↔ iB1−p1−q(¬φ)
– |= Pqp(φ)↔ P1−p1−q(¬φ)
We conclude this section by giving the definition of some derived operators in
DµCEC. They are illustrated in Table 3.
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Table 3. Some derived operators in DµCEC.
⊥ ∆= ¬> false
φ1 ∨ φ2 ∆= ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) Boolean disjunction
φ1 → φ2 ∆= ¬φ1 ∨ φ2 Boolean (material) implication
a φ ∆= ¬ a ¬φ after every a-transitions φ holds
gfpXφ(X)
∆= ¬lfp¬φ(¬X) greatest fixed point of λX.φ(X).
The variable X is assumed to occur
positively in φ. Note that this im-
plies that also ¬X occurs positively
in ¬φ
a pφ
∆= a P1p(φ) there is an a-transition after which
φ holds with probability at least p
· φ
∆=
∨
a∈Act a φ there is a transition after which φ
holds
^· φ
∆=
∨
a∈Act ^a φ there is a transition before which φ
holds
· φ ∆=
∧
a∈Act a φ after all transitions φ holds
a∗
∆= lfpX . a > ∨ · X it is possible to reach a state which
has an a-transition
^a ∗
∆= lfpX . ^a > ∨ ^· X there has been an a-transition in the
past
· ∗φ ∆= lfpX .φ ∧· X φ holds now and at all points in all
the possible futures
ICB
1
pφ
∆= gfpX(
∧
i∈I iB
1
p(X ∧ φ)) φ is common belief among the
agents in I
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4. Application: Dining Cryptographers
This problem, described by Chaum in (Chaum, 1988), involves a situation in which
three cryptographers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, each of them is
secretly informed by the master whether he should pay the bill or not. So, either the
master will pay, or he will ask one of the cryptographers to pay. The cryptographers,
or some external observer, would like to find out whether the payer is one of them or
the master. However, if the payer is one of them, the cryptographers wish to maintain
anonymity over the identity of the payer. Of course, we assume that the master himself
will not reveal this information, and also do we want the solution to be distributed, i.e.
communication can be achieved only via message passing, and there is no central
memory or central ‘coordinator’ which can be used to find out this information.
A possible solution to this problem, described in (Chaum, 1988), is the following:
Each cryptographer tosses a coin, which is visible to himself and to his neighbor to the
right. Each cryptographer then observes the two coins that he can see, and announces
agree or disagree. If a cryptographer is not paying, he will announce agree if the two
sides are the same and disagree if they are not. However, if he is paying then he will
say the opposite. As shown in (Chaum, 1988), if the number of disagrees is even, then
the master is paying; otherwise, one of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if
one of the cryptographers is paying, then neither an external observer nor the other two
cryptographers can identify, from their individual information, who exactly is paying.
In order to specify formally the protocol, we use the probabilistic version of CCS,
CCSp.
It will be convenient to use a notation for value-passing in CCSp, which, following
standard lines, can be expressed in the following way (assuming a finite set of values).
Input c(x) . P =
∑
v cv . P [v/x]
Output c〈v〉 = cv
The protocol can be described as the parallel composition of the coin processes
Coinh, the cryptographer processes Crypt i, the master process Master , and a process
Collect whose purpose is to collect all the declarations of the cryptographers, and
output them in the form of a tuple. The reason for performing this collection is to
avoid the so-called problem of the omniscient scheduler: since technically a scheduler
depends on the history of the computation, it also depends on the choice of the payer.
Hence we could define a scheduler that reveals the identity of the payer via the order
of the declarations (for instance by always scheduling the declaration of the payer as
the last one). See (Chatzikokolakis et al., 2007b) for more details. Collecting the
declarations into one single tuple allows us to avoid this kind of information leak.
The CCSp terms expressing the protocol are given in Table 4. In this representa-
tion, the secret actions are pay i〈x〉, and the observable actions are outall〈y0, y1, y2〉.
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Table 4. The dining cryptographers protocol formalized in CCSp.
Master ∆= (m0〈0〉 .m1〈0〉 .m2〈0〉)⊕p( ◦
∑
0
2 pim0+i〈1〉 .m1+i〈0〉 .m2+i〈0〉)
Crypt i
∆= ci,i(x0) . ci,i+1(x1) .mi(x) . pay i〈x〉 . out i〈x0 + x1 + x〉
Coinh
∆= (ch−1,h〈0〉 . ch,h〈0〉)⊕ph(ch−1,h〈1〉 . ch,h〈1〉)
Collect ∆= out0(y0) . out1(y1) . out2(y2) . outall〈y0, y1, y2〉
DC ∆= (ν~c)(ν ~m)(ν ~out)(Master |∏i Crypt i |∏h Coinh | Collect)
The constants p and pi’s represent the probability that the master pays, and the proba-
bility that cryptographer i pays, respectively.
In the following we model the property of strong anonymity with respect to ex-
ternal agents.3 We assume that, for every external agent i, the actions payj〈b〉 and
payj′〈b′〉 are indistinguishable for i, namely for each agent j, j′ and bit b, b′
fi(payj〈b〉) = fi(payj′〈b′〉)
i.e. the view that i has of payj〈0〉 is the same as of payj〈1〉, payj′〈0〉 and payj′〈1〉.
Strong anonymity can be expressed by the following class of formulas, where p is
an arbitrary number in [0, 1], j stands for payj〈1〉, and the conjunction is taken over
all external agents i: ∧
i
· ∗(iBpp( ^j ∗)→ · ∗iBpp( ^j ∗))
Intuitively, this formula means that at every point of the execution, if Agent i at-
tributes probability p to j (i.e. to Cryptographer j being the payer), then at every point
in the future he will attribute to j the same probability. In other words, the observable
events of the protocol do not help the agent to refine his estimation of the probability
distribution on the secrets. This definition of strong anonymity corresponds to the one
given originally by Chaum (Chaum, 1988), requiring the a priori probability of the
secret event to be equal to its a posteriori one.
It is possible to show that, if the coins are fair, the program illustrated in Table 4
satisfies the formula above.
PROPOSITION 18. —
DC |=
∧
i
· ∗(iBpp( ^j ∗)→ · ∗iBpp( ^j ∗))
3. In order to model anonymity also w.r.t. internal agents we need quantification over probabil-
ities. This is left as future work.
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PROOF. — The proof proceeds by induction, by proving that, for every i, iBpp( ^j ∗)→
· ∗iBpp( ^j ∗) is an invariant which holds at every step of the execution. 
The strong anonymity of the Dining Cryptographers with fair coins was also proved
in (Bhargava et al., 2005). One major difference with respect to that work is that here
we use belief operators, which allow us to express the belief of a given agent. As
a consequence, we can distinguish between the belief of internal agents and external
ones. In (Bhargava et al., 2005) strong anonymity is expressed in terms of equality of
the conditional probabilities of an observable given different culprits, but the relation
between agents and observables is not formalized. An internal agent, for instance,
observes more than an external one because he can see also the results of the adjacent
coins. In the case of a complete ring this is not a problem, but if the ring were in-
complete (i.e. missing one arc) ten there would be a difference between external and
internal agents, in the sense that strong anonymity would hold only for external agents,
not for internal ones. With the approach in (Bhargava et al., 2005) we would not be
able to express this difference formally. This is also related to the fact that an approach
based simply on probabilities cannot distinguish between subjective uncertainty (be-
lief) and objective uncertainty (truth), as already mentioned in the introduction.
5. Application: Oblivious Transfer
An oblivious transfer is a protocol by which an initiator sends some information to
a responder, but remains oblivious (ignorant) as to what was recovered by the respon-
der.
In this section, two variations of the oblivious transfer protocol are considered and
specified in DµCEC. For each of them, we give the expression of the agents’ post-
belief holding after the execution of the protocol, and we give a specification in CCSp
of an implementation for the second one.
5.1. Oblivious Transfer of one bit only
5.1.1. Description
The Oblivious-Transfer-of-one-bit-only protocol,OT b, was first described in (Kilian,
1988). In this protocol, a single secret bit b is transferred between the initiator (e.g.
Alice) and the responder (e.g. Bob). At the end of the protocol, one of the following
two events will have occurred, each with a probability 12 :
1) the responder Bob learns the value of b, or
2) the responder Bob gains no information about the value of b.
20 Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics. Volume 0 – No. 0/0
In both cases, at the end of the protocol, Bob knows which of these two events has
occurred, while the initiator Alice learns nothing about that.
5.1.2. Specification
We express the communication between the agents with two actions s and r defined
as follows:
s
∆= Send(Alice, b,Bob) : Alice sends bit b to Bob
r
∆= Receive(Bob, b) : Bob receives bit b
The OT b protocol can be specified as follows:
OT b
∆= s P
1/2
1/2( r
∗)
Intuitively, this formula means that after the bit was sent by Alice, there is a prob-
ability of 12 that Bob eventually receives it.
The post-belief of the agents after the execution of the protocol can be expressed
as:
PostBelief b
∆= · ∗(ρ(r, s))
where ρ(α, β) ∆= AliceB
1/2
1/2 ^α∗ ∧ P1/21/2(BobK ^β ∗) and aKφ
∆= aB11φ.
This formula can be read as follows: Alice believes with degree of confidence 12
that Bob has received the bit (subjective probability), while, with probability 12 , Bob
knows the bit that Alice has sent (objective probability).
Note that the fact that Bob knows that a formula φ holds (BobKφ) is expressed as
the limit of belief, i.e. BobB11φ.
5.2. The 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
5.2.1. Description
In the 1-out-of-2-Oblivious-Transfer protocol, OT 12 (Kilian, 1988), the initiator
Alice sends two secret strings u and v, of which the responder Bob receives exactly
one. At the end of the protocol, the following three states of affairs hold:
1) Bob learns one of the two strings,
2) Bob gains no information about the other string, and
3) Alice does not know which one of the two strings Bob knows.
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5.2.2. Specification
In the following, with a slight abuse of notation we use the symbols u and v to
represent the actions of sending the messages u and v respectively. Analogously we
represent by u and v the complementary actions of retrieving u and v.
We now express the OT 12 protocol and the agents’ post-beliefs.
The first requirement is that, after Alice sends the two strings, there is a probability
1
2 that Bob retrieves u, and a probability
1
2 that Bob retrieves v.
OT 12
∆= u∗ v∗(P
1/2
1/2(u) ∧ P1/21/2(v))
Secondly, we require that, after the execution of the protocol, Alice believes with
degree of confidence 12 that Bob has received the message u and with degree of confi-
dence 12 that Bob has received the message v (subjective probability), while Bob with
probability 12 knows the message that Alice has sent (objective probability).
PostBelief 1
∆= · ∗(ρ(u, v) ∧ ρ(v, u))
Finally, we require that if Bob receives u, then he gains no further information
about v, and viceversa if he receives v, then he gains no further information about u.
This can be expressed with an invariant, like for the Dining Cryptographers:
PostBelief 2
∆= (∀p%p(v, u)) ∧ (∀q%q(u, v))
where
%p(α, β)
∆= BobBpp( ^α∗)→ (· ∗BobK( ^β ∗)→ BobBpp( ^α∗))
5.2.3. Implementation of the OT 12 protocol using a public-key cryptosystem
We consider here the implementation of the oblivious transfer OT 12 described in
(Even et al., 1985). In the following,M represents the message space and we assume
that all the random choices of messages or bits are made with a uniform probability.
Let , :M×M →M denote two binary operators which satisfy the follow-
ing:
1) For every x ∈M, the mapping y 7→ x y is a permutation onM.
2) For every y ∈M, the mapping x 7→ x y is a permutation onM.
3) For every x, y ∈M, (x y) y = x.
Furthermore, we assume that these operators are known by both agents. For in-
stance, when using RSA as public-key cryptosystem, x y can be defined as the re-
duction modulo N (the RSA’s modulus) of x + y while x y can be defined as the
reduction modulo N of x− y.
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In our process calculus, the OT 12 protocol can be specified as the parallel compo-
sition of the initiator process Init and of the responder process Resp. The initiator
Alice wants to send one of the two strings u and v. She starts the communication
by generating a public key/private key pair (e, d) and sending her public key along
with two random messages m0 and m1 to the responder Bob. Bob chooses a ran-
dom message m and a random bit r and sends back to Alice z = E(m, e)mr,
where E(m, e) denotes the encryption of the message m with the public key e . Simi-
larly, D(c, d) denotes the decryption of a string c with the private key d and we have
D(E(m, e), d) = m.
Alice (who does not know r) computes both e0 = zm0 and e1 = zm1. Then,
Alice decrypts with her private key d both e0 and e1, obtaining respectively d0 and d1.
Only one of these two values, namely dr = D(E(m, e), d), is identical to the initial
message m. This however cannot be determined by Alice since she does not know the
value of r and m.
Alice chooses then a random bit s and transmits to Bob the tuple (u ds, v d1−s, s).
Depending on the choice of s, two independent situations may occur: either s = r,
and thus ds = dr = m and Bob can read u without learning anything about v, or
s = 1 − r and Bob can read v without learning anything about u. Both events have
equal probability to occur (due to the uniform probability on the random choice of r
and s), which ensures that the first and second intended properties of the protocol are
satisfied.
Moreover, since Alice only gets the information z = E(m, e)mr and m is ran-
domly chosen by Bob, z does not give Alice any information about r, which ensures
that the third intended property of the protocol is satisfied as well.
The protocol narration of OT 12 is as follows:
1. Alice
e,m0,m1−−−−−→ Bob
2. Bob
E(m,e)mr−−−−−−−−→ Alice
3. Alice
u ds,v d1−s,s−−−−−−−−−−−→ Bob
We describe the implementation of the protocol OT 12 in CCSp in Table 5.
The unfolding of the CCSp terms representing the protocol OT 12 is illustrated in
Table 6.
5.2.4. Verification
In this section we show that our protocol satisfies OT 12, PostBelief 1 and
PostBelief 2.
The initial prefix in the formula for OT 12 specifies that eventually, the actions u
and v occur (i.e. the messages u and v are sent): POT 1(5,6)2 |= OT 12. This is in-
deed achieved in our protocol by the (synchronous) action out2 performed in step
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Table 5. Implementation of the protocol OT 12 in CCSp. The probabilities p and q
represent the uniform probabilities over the space of message pairs (m0,m1) and the
space of the messages m, respectively.
Init ∆= ◦∑m0,m1 p out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦∑s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Resp ∆= out1(e, x0, x1) . ◦
∑
r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
POT 12
∆= ν(Init |Resp)
POT 1(4,4)2 . The remaining part of the formula OT
1
2 is true if u and v are received
each with a probability of exactly one half, which holds as explained beforehand in
the protocol description.
On the contrary to OT 12, the prefixes of PostBelief 1 and PostBelief 2 are used to
describe invariant properties that have therefore to hold at every step of the protocol:
∀(i, j) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 5), (5, 6)},POT 1(i,j)2 |=
PostBelief 1 ∧ PostBelief 2.
The first part of PostBelief 1, AliceB
1/2
1/2( ^u∗) ∧ AliceB1/21/2( ^v ∗), which describes
the subjective knowledge of Alice, is the transcription of the third axiom, while the
remaining of the formula, which specifies an objective knowledge of Bob, corresponds
to the first axiom. Similarly, PostBelief 2 is the transcription of the second axiom. We
already saw that these axioms, and thus PostBelief 1 and PostBelief 2 hold at the end
of the protocol. They also hold at the beginning of the protocol. From the description
of the protocol, one can finally see that no step leads to a change of these beliefs.
Therefore, PostBelief 1 and PostBelief 2 hold at each step of the protocol.
Note that for the sake of simplicity, several aspects of our description which were
not directly necessary for our purposes, such as the cryptographic primitives or the
fixpoint operators, have been left informal.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Achievements
We have achieved novel formalizations of probabilistic anonymity and oblivious
transfer in a promising modal logic, namely the doxastic µ-calculus with error control
(DµCEC). Our formalizations can be validated on the protocol of the dining cryptog-
raphers, and on the protocols of 1-bit and 1-out-of-2-strings oblivious transfer. The
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Table 6. Unfolding of the protocol OT 12.
Initiator
Init0 := ◦∑m0,m1 p out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦∑s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init1 := out1〈e,m0,m1〉 . in(z) .
◦∑s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init2 := in(z) .
◦∑s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init3 := ◦∑s∈{0,1} 1/2 out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init4 := out2〈uD(zms, d), vD(zm1−s, d), s〉 . 0
Init5 := 0
Responder
Resp0 := out1(e, x0, x1) . ◦
∑
r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦
∑
m q in〈E(m, e)xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp1 := ◦∑r∈{0,1} 1/2 ◦∑m q in〈E(m, e)xr〉 .
out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp2 := ◦∑m q in〈E(m, e)xr〉 . out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp3 := in〈E(m, e)xr〉 . out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp4 := out2(y0, y1, s) . out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp5 := out〈ys+r m〉 . 0
Resp6 := 0
Protocol
POT 1(i,j)2
∆= ν(Init i|Respj)
Unfolding:
POT 1(0,0)2
m0,m1−−−−→ POT 1(1,0)2
τ(out1)−−−−−→ POT 1(2,1)2 r−→ POT 1(2,2)2
q−→
POT 1(2,3)2
τ(in)−−−→ POT 1(3,4)2 s−→ POT 1(4,4)2
τ(out2)−−−−−→ POT 1(5,5)2 out−−→ POT 1(5,6)2
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intuitiveness of our formalizations is due to (1) our distinction between belief and
internalized probabilistic truth, (2) the dynamicity of our notion of belief and inter-
nalized probabilistic truth, and (3) the introduction of lower and upper bounds (error
control) therefor.
We have also shown that belief and internalized probabilistic truth satisfy a proba-
bilistic analogue of standard KD45-belief, and that belief and internalized probabilistic
truth can be flattened on certain, but different conditions.
6.2. Future work
As future work for DµCEC, we envisage the development of tool-support, its ax-
iomatization, and the introduction of cryptographic data types and restricted logical
quantification (over messages, including probability values).
Further, the combination of operators for belief with error control and time allows
for the expression of probabilistic statements as arbitrary compound sentences in our
logic, rather than as compound terms as in the language of traditional probability the-
ory. It is natural to study the advantages and disadvantages between these two styles
of expression.
Finally, given the expressibility of oblivious transfer in DµCEC and the founda-
tional power of oblivious transfer for modern cryptography (Kilian, 1988), we believe
that DµCEC can serve as a framework for comparing abstract cryptography based on
Dolev-Yao message-passing and concrete cryptography based on bit-string message-
passing, thus bringing a new approach to a problem that has received a lot of attention
recently, see for intance the work of (Cortier et al., 2007).
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